The Impact of Migration and Remittance on Household Welfare: Evidence from Vietnam by Nguyen, Cuong & Vu, Linh
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Impact of Migration and Remittance
on Household Welfare: Evidence from
Vietnam
Cuong Nguyen and Linh Vu
10 March 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80084/
MPRA Paper No. 80084, posted 8 July 2017 14:48 UTC
 1
The Impact of Migration and Remittance on Household Welfare: 
Evidence from Vietnam 
 
 
 
Nguyen Viet Cuong* 
Vu Hoang Linh** 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the pattern and the impact of migration and remittances on household 
welfare in Vietnam using fixed-effects regressions and panel data from Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Surveys 2010 and 2012. Overall, the effect of migration as 
well as remittances on employment of remaining members on home households is small. 
People in households with migration and remittances tend to work less than people in 
other households. There is no evidence that migration and remittances can help household 
members to work more on non-farm activities. Remittances, especially international 
remittances help receiving households increase per capita income and per capita 
expenditure. Although migration leads to an increase in remittances, it also leads to a 
reduction in income earned by migrants if they had not migrated. However, per capita 
consumption expenditure of migrant-sending households increases because of a reduction 
in household size.  
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1. Introduction 
Migration has been a popular livelihood strategy of people, especially in developing 
countries. According to the New Economics Theory of Migration, migration is viewed as 
a collective decision of not only individuals but also their families, and the main incentive 
for migration is high income in the destination areas (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark and 
Taylor, 1991; Stark, 1991). Households can decide to move the whole family or just send 
individual members for migration. The migration cost of the whole family is often high 
for migrating households. As a result households tend to send one or two members for 
migration.  
In addition to impacts on migrants, migration also has different impacts on 
migrant-sending households. Migration means the absence of labors in the home 
households, and this can affect the labor supply and consumption pattern of the 
households. Remaining adult people might spend more time on housework and taking care 
of dependent members, thereby less time on working. Taylor and López-Feldman (2010) 
find that migration reduces labour-intensive production of household due to a shortage of 
labour. A change in household composition due to migration can lead to a change in 
consumption pattern of remaining members.  
Another direct impact of migration on the migrant-sending households is through 
remittances (Stark and Taylor, 1991; Stark, 1991; McKenzie and Sasin, 2007). Migrants 
send remittances to their home households for several reasons. Firstly, migration can be a 
decision of the whole family instead of individual members. Households are expected to 
have higher income through remittances as they send their members for migrations. Thus 
after finding jobs and having income, migrants are expected to send remittances to 
contribute to the household income. For some households, migration is costly and they 
have to borrow to pay for migration. Remittances are used to pay for this debt.  
Secondly, migrants can send remittance simply because of altruism. According the 
altruism theories the utility of a person depends on not only her own consumption but also 
on the consumption of her/his family, and as a result sending remittances to family can 
increase the utility of migrants (Becker, 1974; Barro, 1974; Cox, 1987, 1992). The 
remittances are expected to increase not only income but also consumption of households.  
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Thirdly, as interpreted by the theory on exchange motives, migrants can send 
remittances to home households to get some benefits in return (Cox, 1987). For example, 
migrants can send remittances so that the recipients will take care of their assets or family 
or invest in activities with high return on capital than in destination areas. Thus 
remittances can lead to a change in not only consumption but also labor and production of 
home households.  
The total effect of migration on migrant-sending households is a priori unknown, 
since there are different channels through which migration can affect the migrant-sending 
households. Whether migration helps home households improve welfare and reduce 
poverty is an empirical question. There are a large number of studies on the effects of 
migration on welfare of migrant-sending households. The findings are mixed. Adams and 
Page (2005) find a strong effect on poverty reduction of international remittances in 
developing countries. Positive impacts of remittances on household welfare and child 
education are found in some studies such as Adams (1991, 2004, 2006), Acosta et al. 
(2007), Adams et al. (2008); Taylor and Lopez-Feldman (2010). 
However, several studies do not find positive effects of international remittances 
on migrant-sending households. For example, using cross-countries data, Cattaneo (2005) 
does not find any effect of international remittances on poverty reduction. Other studies 
such as Stahl (1982) and Azam and Gubert (2006) do not find poverty-reducing effects of 
remittances. In Yang (2004), migration is showed to reduce labor supply and income of 
remaining household members in the Philippines. In several studies, parental migration 
has a negative effect of children’s education (e.g., Kiros and White, 2004; McKenzie and 
Rapoport, 2006; Antman, 2010; Wang, 2011) 
The existing studies, both theoretical and empirical, show a wide diversity of 
results of the impact of migration on migrant-sending households. Whether the effect of 
migration is positive or negative depend on different country context, and this calls for 
more empirical studies to better understand the economic effects of international migration 
and remittances. In this study, we will aim to estimate the effect of migration and 
remittances on labor supply, consumption and poverty of home households in Vietnam.   
Vietnam is a transition country with a large flow of internal as well as international 
migration.  According to the 2009 Population and Housing Census, around 8.5 percent of 
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the Vietnamese population changed their residence during 2004-2009. There are around 
3.2 million Vietnamese living abroad (Nguyen and Mont, 2012). These people send a 
large flow of international remittances to Vietnam. In 2014, the total remittances to 
Vietnam reached 11 billion USD, accounting for around 6 percent of total GDP (Phuong, 
2014). 
There are several studies looking at the effect of migration and remittances on 
migrants’ origin households. Migration is found to have a positive effect on households’ 
consumption and poverty reduction in several studies including Brauw and Harigaya 
(2007), Nguyen et al. (2008), Nguyen et al. (2011). Using Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Surveys (VHLSS) 2002 and 2004, Nguyen (2008) finds that international 
remittances helped receiving household increase consumption and reduce poverty. 
However, using VHLSSs 2006 and 2008 Nguyen and Mont (2012) and Nguyen et al. 
(2013) do not find a poverty-reducing effect of international remittances.  
Compared with previous studies on migration and remittances in Vietnam, this 
study has several different aspects. Firstly, this study uses more updated household 
surveys (Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys in 2010 and 2012) to analyse the 
pattern and impact of migration and remittances. Migration and remittances are dynamic 
and changing significantly overtime in Vietnam. Secondly, this examines the effect of 
both migration and remittances, while most previous studies mainly focus on either 
migration or remittances. Thirdly, this study will look at the impact of migration and 
remittances on different outcomes of households including education, labor, income and 
consumption. By examining the impact on a series of household outcomes, this study is 
expected to provide an insightful understanding of mechanism that migration can affect 
migrant-sending households.    
 This paper is structured in 6 sections. The second section introduces the data sets 
used in this study. The third section presents description of the migration and remittance 
trend in Vietnam. The fourth and fifth sections present the estimation method and 
empirical results of the impact of migration and remittances, respectively. Finally, the 
sixth section discusses the main findings and policy recommendations.  
 
2. Data set  
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This study relies on the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys in 2010 and 2012. 
The 2010 and 2012 VHLSSs were also conducted by GSO with technical supports from 
the World Bank in Vietnam. Each VHLSS covered 9,399 households, representative at 
regional levels. VHLSSs contain panel data on 4,157 households. 
The data set includes detailed data on individuals, households and communes. 
Individual data consist of information on demographics, education, employment, health, 
migration. Household data are on durables, assets, production, income and expenditures, 
and participation in government’s programs. 
Regarding remittances, all the VHLSSs contain data on remittances, both domestic 
and foreign, received by households. However, information on migrants is limited in 
VHLSSs. In all the VHLSSs, there are questions on household members who are working 
far from home. Information includes gender, age, and education of these migrants. 
However, there is no information on the current location of the migrants. As a result, we 
are not able to identify whether migrants are living inside or outside Vietnam. 
Unlike the 2010 VHLSS and previous VHLSSs, the 2012 VHLSS contains a 
special module on migration. It asked households about their migrating members: 
employment and characteristics of migrating members. It also contains data on the current 
location of migrants so that we can define internal and international migrants.  
 
3. Migration and remittances in Vietnam 
 
Figure 1 presents the percentage of household having at least a migrant, either internal or 
international migrants in 2010 and 2012. The proportion of migrant-sending households in 
Vietnam increased from 12.1% to 15.4% during 2010-2012. This proportion increased in 
both rural and urban areas and in all the six regions. Rural households are much more 
likely to send migrants than urban ones. Northern and Coastal Central is the region having 
the highest proportion of migrant-sending households. Located in the center of Vietnam, 
people in this region can move to either Red River Delta or Central Highland or Southeast.  
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Southeast which is the richest region in Vietnam has the lowest proportion of migrant-
sending households. 
Figure 1: The percentage of households having migrants 
 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
Figure 2: The percentage of households having international migrants 
 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
In Figure 2, we present the percentage of households having at least an 
international migrant using the 2012 VHLSS. As mentioned in previous section, there are 
no data on the location of migrants in the 2010 VHLSS, and as a result we cannot separate 
the internal and international migrants in the 2010 VHLSSs. It shows that the proportion 
of households with international migrant is 1.9%, lowers than the proportion of 
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households with internal migrants. Northern and Coastal Central is the region having the 
highest proportion of international-migrant-sending households, while Central Highland 
has the lowest proportion.  
In Figure 3, we used the 2014 Mid-term Population and Housing Census to 
examine the geographical pattern of migration. The 2014 Mid-term Population and 
Housing Census contains data on the change of residence of the population within the five 
years during 2009-2014. It shows that a high proportion of out-migration in some 
provinces in Northern and Coastal Central and Mekong River Delta regions. Hau Giang 
and Ca Mau are the two provinces with the highest rate of out-migration with the rate of 
5.4% and 5.2%, respectively. Regarding in-migration, Binh Duong and Ho Chi Minh city 
are the two provinces attract the most migrants. People in Northern Mountain are less 
likely to migrate, since the cost of migrants can be high for them. This area is also poor 
and there is a low inflow of migrants to this area.  
Figure 3: Emigration and immigration rate by provinces 
Percentage of households migrating out of 
province during 2009-2014 
Percentage of households migrating into 
province during 2009-2014 
 
 
Source: authors’ estimates from the 2014 Mid-term Population and Housing Census 
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The percentage of households receiving internal and international remittances was 
27.4 percent and 33.3 percent in 2010 and 2012, respectively. The proportion of 
households receiving remittances is lower than the proportion of households having 
migrants, since remittances are sent to households by not only household members but 
also households’ relatives. The proportion of households receiving international 
remittances was 4.4 percent in 2010 and 4.6 percent in 2012. Rural households are more 
likely to receive internal remittances but less likely to receiving international remittances 
than urban households.  
It should be noted that not all migrant-sending households receive remittances. In 
2010, 9.5 percent and 69.3 percent of migrant-sending households received international 
and internal remittances, respectively. In 2012, these corresponding figures are 9.6 percent 
and 57.6 percent, respectively. 
Table 1: The percentage of households with migrants and remittances by regions 
Areas 
% having migrating 
members 
% receiving internal 
remittances 
% receiving international 
remittances 
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Total 9.1 12.7 27.4 33.3 4.4 4.6 
Urban/rural 
      
Rural 11.3 15.5 28.5 33.6 3.4 3.7 
Urban 4.1 6.4 25.0 32.6 6.7 6.9 
Regions 
      
Red River Delta 8.4 11.7 27.6 35.9 3.2 3.3 
Midlands and Northern Mountains 9.5 12.5 25.4 28.1 2.6 1.9 
Northern and Coastal Central 13.4 20.4 29.6 33.0 5.2 5.3 
Central Highlands 3.8 6.6 8.1 10.8 1.8 1.9 
Southeast 2.4 3.4 28.3 41.1 6.5 7.1 
Mekong Delta 12.1 15.4 30.7 33.4 5.2 5.9 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
 
Table 2 presents the proportion of households with migration and remittances by 
several characteristics of households. Kinh households are more likely to have a higher 
proportion of migration and remittances than ethnic minorities. Households with female 
heads are more likely to receive more remittances than households with male heads. 
Possibly, men tend to migrate than women, and without men in home households women 
are more likely to become household heads. 
People with higher education tend to migrate than those with lower education, 
since they can find jobs in destination easier (Borjas, 2005; Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005). 
However, Table 2 shows that the association between education of household heads and 
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migration as well as remittances is not strong. Households with high education heads have 
a lower proportion of sending migrants than households with low education heads. 
However, there is a strong association between consumption expenditure and remittances, 
especially international remittances. Households receiving remittances tend to belong to 
high expenditure quintile.   
Table 2: Percentage of households with migrants and remittances by household variables 
Household groups 
% having migrating 
members 
% receiving internal 
remittances 
% receiving international 
remittances 
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Ethnicity        
Kinh/Hoa 9.5 13.4 28.9 34.9 4.8 5.1 
Ethnic minorities 5.9 8.1 17.3 22.8 1.4 1.3 
Gender of household head       
Female head 10.3 12.6 29.6 37.3 5.7 6.9 
Male head 8.7 12.8 26.6 31.9 3.9 3.8 
Completed education level of head 
  
  
  
< Primary 9.2 13.2 27.5 33.7 3.4 3.5 
Primary 8.8 12.7 26.7 33.1 4.5 4.5 
Lower-secondary 11.7 15.1 30.1 34.7 4.1 5.1 
Upper-secondary 7.9 10.8 28.8 33.8 5.3 4.9 
Technical degree 8.0 12.0 24.8 31.6 6.3 4.7 
Post-secondary 3.8 6.3 23.0 29.7 4.7 7.1 
Per capita expenditure quintile 
  
  
  
Poorest 5.8 11.0 23.6 32.0 1.0 2.1 
Near poorest 11.6 13.8 27.9 33.7 2.0 2.8 
Middle 11.7 15.1 30.4 35.1 3.4 3.7 
Near richest 10.0 13.9 29.1 35.2 5.9 5.7 
Richest 6.3 10.2 25.7 30.7 8.4 8.1 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
 
 Table 3 presents the average remittances received by households in nominal price. 
Although the amount of internal remittances increased during 2010-2012, the amount of 
internal remittances decreased during this period. Remittances play an important role for 
households. In 2012, for households receiving remittances, internal remittances and 
international represent for 8.8 percent and 37.9 percent of total household expenditure, 
respectively.  
The average amount of internal remittances received by urban households was 
higher than the average amount of internal remittances received by rural ones in both 
years 2010 and 2012. The international remittances were higher for urban households than 
rural households in 2010. However, in 2012 rural households received a higher amount of 
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international remittances than urban households. This interesting change should be 
examined in further studies to understand the reasons.  
The ratio of remittances to consumption expenditure is higher in rural households 
than urban ones. In Midlands and Northern Mountains, international remittances account 
for a high proportion in the total expenditure in 2012 for receiving households.  
Table 3: Remittance amount by urban/rural areas and regions 
Areas 
Internal remittance 
amount (thousand 
VND) 
Share of internal 
remittance in total 
expenditure (%) 
International 
remittance amount 
(thousand VND) 
Share of international 
remittance in total 
expenditure (%) 
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Total 3715.0 4723.3 9.3 8.8 36261.6 35349.0 42.1 37.9 
Urban/rural 
        
Rural 3234.7 4167.1 9.4 9.3 31164.4 37792.7 47.7 48.5 
Urban 4809.2 6021.3 9.1 7.5 42063.9 32313.5 35.7 24.8 
Regions 
        
Red River Delta 4405.8 5901.7 9.1 9.9 41749.1 36975.2 61.1 44.7 
Midlands and 
Northern Mountains 2052.5 2945.2 8.1 7.5 45616.2 46380.8 68.2 66.5 
Northern and 
Coastal Central 3058.3 3640.2 9.3 7.9 24855.0 32339.9 34.2 37.8 
Central Highlands 1460.6 2859.5 4.0 4.2 4711.0 11738.0 7.2 6.0 
Southeast 5224.4 6229.3 10.7 9.3 41804.0 28056.3 36.2 23.2 
Mekong Delta 3974.6 4892.3 10.6 10.1 38827.1 40388.4 37.3 36.5 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
 
The ratio of remittances in total consumption expenditure is higher for 
disadvantaged household groups such as ethnic minority households and households with 
low expenditure and low education heads.    
Table 4: Remittance amount by urban/rural areas and regions 
Household groups 
Internal remittance 
amount (thousand 
VND) 
Share of internal 
remittance in total 
expenditure (%) 
International 
remittance amount 
(thousand VND) 
Share of international 
remittance in total 
expenditure (%) 
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Ethnicity 
        
Kinh/Hoa 4064.5 5133.4 13.4 12.6 36922.6 34752.9 42.0 36.7 
Ethnic minorities 1314.8 1942.2 9.4 9.6 20237.6 51515.0 43.4 72.2 
Gender of household head       
Female head 5762.1 6104.0 21.5 15.9 37362.0 33432.4 44.9 35.8 
Male head 2994.5 4234.6 9.8 10.8 35697.0 36569.8 40.6 39.3 
Completed education level of head 
      
< Primary 3056.2 4492.8 17.4 16.5 22644.1 30303.5 37.1 38.7 
Primary 2976.4 4347.7 13.4 12.7 35150.2 36398.1 43.0 38.3 
Lower-secondary 3061.4 4052.8 11.4 11.2 35317.5 39585.5 53.6 48.8 
Upper-secondary 4666.3 5496.3 10.5 9.9 35431.0 28948.5 32.6 24.8 
Technical degree 4167.3 5426.4 10.9 10.3 49868.8 37423.8 42.2 36.5 
Post-secondary 8646.5 7179.0 10.1 6.3 46377.2 33907.3 29.1 20.6 
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Household groups 
Internal remittance 
amount (thousand 
VND) 
Share of internal 
remittance in total 
expenditure (%) 
International 
remittance amount 
(thousand VND) 
Share of international 
remittance in total 
expenditure (%) 
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Per capita expenditure quintile 
      
Poorest 1624.4 2679.8 13.0 14.3 13354.6 24285.0 50.4 55.3 
Near poorest 2485.7 3098.2 13.7 13.2 20425.7 25207.4 44.9 45.2 
Middle 3064.6 4455.6 15.0 13.4 21765.3 28244.7 46.6 35.8 
Near richest 3461.9 5648.7 10.8 12.0 23459.8 41194.8 35.6 45.3 
Richest 7147.8 7119.6 13.0 9.1 55101.2 39771.4 43.3 28.4 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
 
 
4. Estimation methods  
 
In this study, we will estimate the effect of migration and remittances on a number of 
outcomes including labor supply, income, consumption and poverty status of households. 
We first estimate the effect of migration, and then the effect of remittances. We assume a 
similar specification for estimating the effect of migration on household outcomes: 
                         itiitittit vuMigrationXGY +++++= 3210)ln( ββββ ,                      (1) 
where )ln( itY  is log of per capita income or log of consumption expenditure of household i 
in year t; Xit is a vector of household variables; Migrationit is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the household i has at least a migrant in year t; ui and υit are unobserved time-
invariant and time-variant variables, respectively.  
 Regarding remittances, we have data on the size of international and internal 
remittances. We can estimate the impact of both international and internal remittances on 
household outcomes as follows: 
( ) ( ) ,_ln_ln)ln( 43210 itiititittit vureInternalrenalInternatioXGY ++++++= βββββ  (2) 
where itrenalInternatio _  and itreInternal _  are amount of international remittances and 
internal remittances received by household i at time t, respectively. To measure the 
elasticity of household income (or consumption expenditure) to remittances, we use a 
double-log function in which both income (or consumption expenditure) and remittances 
are measured in log. A problem with the logarithm of remittances is that there are 
households with zero value of remittances. To avoid the dropping of observations without 
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land, we apply the method of Battese (1997) which allows zero values of explanatory 
variables in the double-log function. According to Battese (1997), the following equation 
is estimated instead of equation (2): 
( ) { }
( ) { } ,0__ln             
0__ln)ln(
6
*
5
4
*
321
*
0
itiitit
ititittit
vureInternalIreInternal
renalInternatioIrenalInternatioXGY
++=++
=++++=
ββ
βββββ
   (3) 
where { }0_ =itrenalInternatioI  is the indicator variable which is equal to one if 
0_ =itrenalInternatio , and zero if 0_ >itrenalInternatio . 
*
_ itrenalInternatio  is equal to 
itrenalInternatio _  if 0_ >itrenalInternatio , and one if 0_ =itrenalInternatio . 
Similarly, variables { }0_ =itreInternalI  and *_ itreInternal  are defined by the same way.  
A challenge in estimating the impact of migration as well as remittances is the bias 
caused by omitted variables. Households with migration and remittances can differ from 
households without migration and remittances in not only observed characteristics but also 
unobserved characteristics. To deal with bias, a standard econometric method is 
instrumental variable regression. Finding an instrument which is strongly correlated with 
migration or remittances but do not affect outcomes directly is very difficult. Thus in this 
study, we can use the panel nature of the data to avoid this endogeneity bias. More 
specifically, we will use household fixed-effect regression, which relies on a main 
assumption of the method that unobserved variables in the outcome equation that are 
correlated with both outcome and migration (remittances) remained unchanged during the 
period 2010-2012. Fixed-effects regression can eliminate the unobserved variables, ui  that 
are time-invariant during the panel data period. The fixed-effect regression is still biased if 
the unobserved time-variant variables are correlated with migration and remittances. It is 
expected that the bias caused by the omitted time-variant variables is small once we 
control for observed variables and time-invariant observed variables.  
 It should be noted that we use both household outcomes and individual outcomes. 
The individual outcomes are school enrolment and employment variables. For individual 
outcomes, we also use a similar function as equations (1) and (3).  
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5. Empirical results 
 
5.1. The impact of migration and remittances on individual outcomes 
 
In this section, we present the empirical findings from the impact of migration and 
remittances on original households of migrants using fixed-effects regression. We first 
examine the effect on individual outcomes including school enrolment and labor supply 
using individual fixed-effects regression. The control variables include household-level. 
Individual variables such as age and gender are eliminated in fixed-effects regression. We 
tend to use more exogenous control variables, which are not affected by migration and 
remittances (Heckman et al., 1999; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The outcome variables are 
listed in Tables A.1 to A.3 in Appendix, while the explanatory variables are list in Table 
A.4 in Appendix. We also try regressions without explanatory variables. The results are 
similar to those in regressions with explanatory variables. In this paper, we present the 
results from regression using the explanatory variables.  
 In Table 5, we regress the school enrollment of children and young people on 
migration. There is no significant effect of migration on school enrolment of children aged 
6 to 14. However, there is a significant effect for young people from 15 to 22. These ages 
are corresponding to ages in the upper secondary school and college/university in 
Vietnam. Adolescents in migrant-sending households have the probability of attending 
schools, around 0.08 higher than those in other households. This difference is quite high 
given that the enrolment rate of this age group is around 50 percent. There is no effect of 
remittances on school enrolment. It implies that the main channel through which 
migration can improve education is not remittances. This finding should be interpreted 
with caution. The positive relation between migration and education might be caused by 
omitted variables. According to Coxhed (2014) migrants tend to have higher education 
than non-migrants in Vietnam. Members in migrant-sending households might have more 
education than those in households not sending migrants because of not migration but 
other factors such as culture or household’s attention to education.  
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Table 5: Fixed-effects regression of school enrolment 
Explanatory variables 
Sample of children 
aged 6-14 
Sample of people 
aged 15-22 
Having at least a migrant (yes=1, no=0) -0.0389  0.0794**  
(0.0246)  (0.0385)  
Log of internal remittance  0.0060  0.0088 
 (0.0068)  (0.0117) 
Log of international remittance  0.0131*  0.0171 
 (0.0072)  (0.0253) 
Receiving internal remittance (yes=1, no=0)  0.0404  0.0536 
 (0.0567)  (0.0873) 
Receiving international remittance (yes=1, no=0)  0.1175*  0.0745 
 (0.0708)  (0.2132) 
Household size 0.0036 0.0075 0.0010 -0.0036 
 
(0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0097) (0.0092) 
Proportion of children below 15 in household 0.3487*** 0.3349*** -0.0005 0.0276 
 
(0.0586) (0.0581) (0.1136) (0.1134) 
Proportion of elderly above 60 in household 0.0201 -0.0101 -0.1757 -0.1433 
 
(0.1066) (0.1053) (0.1611) (0.1614) 
Proportion of female members in household -0.0909 -0.1035 -0.1533 -0.1267 
 
(0.1133) (0.1124) (0.1212) (0.1192) 
Sex of household head (male=1; female=0) 0.0078 0.0185 -0.0933** -0.0857** 
 
(0.0473) (0.0463) (0.0395) (0.0395) 
Age of household head 0.0212*** 0.0228*** 0.0151 0.0161 
 
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
Age of household head squared -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0002 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Number of schooling years of household head -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0001 -0.0010 
 
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0078) (0.0081) 
Dummy year 2012 -0.0280*** -0.0306*** -0.1237*** -0.1207*** 
 
(0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0126) (0.0129) 
Constant 0.2973* 0.0839 0.3165 0.1666 
(0.1693) (0.1907) (0.3410) (0.4129) 
Observations 4726 4726 4186 4186 
Number of individuals 2363 2363 2093 2093 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
Table 6 examines the effect of migration and remittances on the probability of 
working of household members. Around 10 percent of children have to work for income 
generation activities, but they have to work only few hours per months (Table A.1 in 
Appendix). The proportion of the elderly working is higher in migrant-sending households 
than other households. However, regression analysis shows there is no significant effect of 
migration on working for children as well elderly.    
Young people aged 15-22 in migrant-sending households are less likely to work 
than those in other households. This is consistent with the findings on education. These 
people are more likely to study, thus less likely to work.  
Receipt of international remittances reduces the probability to work of children and 
people slightly. If the international remittance amount increases by 1 percent, the 
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probability of working of people aged 23-60 decreases by 0.025 percentage point. This 
effect is very small.  
Table 6: Fixed-effects regression of working 
Explanatory variables Sample of children 
aged 6-14 
Sample of people 
aged 15-22 
Sample of people 
aged 23-60 
Sample of people 
aged from 60 
Having at least a migrant 
(yes=1, no=0) 
0.0088  -0.0876**  -0.0108  0.0487  
(0.0492)  (0.0375)  (0.0096)  (0.0334)  
Log of internal remittance  -0.0058  -0.0157  -0.0032  0.0019 
 (0.0070)  (0.0100)  (0.0033)  (0.0124) 
Log of international 
remittance 
 -0.0432*  -0.0442*  -0.0252**  -0.0466 
 (0.0234)  (0.0261)  (0.0104)  (0.0357) 
Not receiving internal 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
 -0.0305  -0.1322*  -0.0230  0.0310 
 (0.0529)  (0.0764)  (0.0227)  (0.1029) 
Not receiving international 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
 -0.3896*  -0.3423  -0.2309**  -0.3418 
 (0.2186)  (0.2311)  (0.0959)  (0.3563) 
Household size -0.0065 -0.0093 0.0039 0.0084 0.0017 0.0014 -0.0246 -0.0280* 
 
(0.0093) (0.0102) (0.0120) (0.0113) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0151) (0.0152) 
Proportion of children 
below 15 in household 
-0.225*** -0.213*** 0.2031* 0.1748 -0.0046 -0.0064 0.2331 0.2451* 
(0.0712) (0.0687) (0.1159) (0.1117) (0.0296) (0.0297) (0.1516) (0.1484) 
Proportion of elderly above 
60 in household 
-0.0245 -0.0097 0.1737 0.1450 -0.0170 -0.0204 0.1396 0.1362 
(0.1619) (0.1579) (0.1877) (0.1886) (0.0431) (0.0428) (0.1229) (0.1222) 
Proportion of female 
members in household 
-0.0406 -0.0232 0.1341 0.1067 0.0268 0.0240 0.0642 0.0512 
(0.1348) (0.1325) (0.1145) (0.1122) (0.0457) (0.0452) (0.1153) (0.1178) 
Sex of household head 
(male=1; female=0) 
-0.0243 -0.0350 0.0088 0.0050 0.0095 0.0090 -0.0185 -0.0158 
(0.0520) (0.0506) (0.0574) (0.0540) (0.0368) (0.0371) (0.0818) (0.0847) 
Age of household head -0.0193** -0.0206** -0.0228* -0.0245** -0.0073* -0.0074* -0.0088 -0.0078 
 
(0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0117) (0.0113) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0156) (0.0154) 
Age of household head 
squared 
0.0002* 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Number of schooling years 
of household head 
0.0006 0.0009 -0.0101 -0.0096 -0.0037* -0.0037* 0.0069 0.0067 
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0080) (0.0082) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0080) (0.0077) 
Dummy year 2012 0.0480*** 0.0513*** 0.1056*** 0.1030*** 0.0111** 0.0113*** -0.070*** -0.064*** (0.0089) (0.0092) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0155) (0.0149) 
Constant 0.7679*** 1.2299*** 0.9918*** 1.4976*** 1.1441*** 1.4013*** 0.7149 1.0266* 
 
(0.2715) (0.3438) (0.3461) (0.4077) (0.1304) (0.1551) (0.4699) (0.6017) 
Observations 4726 4726 4186 4186 15406 15406 2806 2806 
Number of individuals 2363 2363 2093 2093 7703 7703 1403 1403 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
In Table 7, we regress the number of working hours per month on migration and 
remittances. It shows that migration and remittances reduce the working hours of people 
aged from 15 to 60. Internal remittances tend to decrease the working hours of children. 
However, there are no significant effects of migration as well remittances on working 
hours of the elderly.   
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Table 7: Fixed-effects regression of the number of working hours per month 
Explanatory variables Sample of children 
aged 6-14 
Sample of people 
aged 15-22 
Sample of people 
aged 23-60 
Sample of people 
aged from 60 
Having at least a migrant 
(yes=1, no=0) 
6.71  -21.84***  -7.21**  -1.70  
(5.01)  (8.14)  (3.60)  (6.26)  
Log of internal remittance  -1.93**  -1.82  -3.19**  -1.59 
 (0.96)  (2.22)  (1.29)  (1.77) 
Log of international 
remittance 
 -0.65  -8.96**  -6.42**  -3.34 
 (2.27)  (4.15)  (2.89)  (5.29) 
Not receiving internal 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
 -13.23**  -9.63  -27.07***  -8.15 
 (6.68)  (17.22)  (10.20)  (13.73) 
Not receiving international 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
 -6.25  -70.19*  -51.68*  -10.36 
 (18.65)  (36.00)  (26.81)  (52.37) 
Household size -1.36 -2.08 -2.25 -1.01 -0.26 -0.23 -4.52 -4.93* 
 
(1.46) (1.45) (2.95) (2.95) (1.56) (1.50) (2.83) (2.88) 
Proportion of children 
below 15 in household 
-38.74*** -36.12*** 49.16** 41.35* -4.73 -5.59 25.20 25.47 
(9.48) (9.34) (23.96) (24.02) (12.62) (12.53) (28.19) (27.55) 
Proportion of elderly above 
60 in household 
-3.75 2.40 27.43 20.33 -1.09 -2.91 11.42 10.32 
(25.18) (24.93) (42.75) (43.26) (13.66) (13.55) (23.62) (22.77) 
Proportion of female 
members in household 
-0.41 1.04 77.83*** 71.24*** 17.81 17.03 1.00 -0.09 
(18.39) (18.02) (26.71) (26.56) (18.02) (17.65) (16.69) (16.94) 
Sex of household head 
(male=1; female=0) 
0.31 -1.12 8.96 7.09 16.95 16.41 2.60 4.83 
(5.84) (5.81) (12.84) (12.56) (15.52) (15.65) (9.62) (10.09) 
Age of household head -2.54*** -2.86*** -2.47 -2.75 1.47 1.45 1.88 1.82 
 
(0.91) (0.92) (3.86) (3.86) (1.86) (1.87) (2.66) (2.64) 
Age of household head 
squared 
0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of schooling years 
of household head 
-0.19 -0.13 -3.86** -3.63** -0.40 -0.50 -0.83 -0.86 
(0.50) (0.50) (1.58) (1.62) (0.94) (0.95) (1.35) (1.29) 
Dummy year 2012 5.54*** 6.07*** 29.40*** 28.80*** -4.92*** -4.88*** -8.07*** -7.38*** (1.07) (1.10) (2.82) (2.87) (1.67) (1.66) (2.34) (2.29) 
Constant 96.50*** 126.74*** 114.56 198.28* 119.74** 198.82*** 24.48 46.29 
 
(26.22) (31.66) (111.36) (118.03) (55.09) (62.44) (84.50) (102.38) 
Observations 4726 4726 4186 4186 15406 15406 2806 2806 
Number of individuals 2363 2363 2093 2093 7703 7703 1403 1403 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
 There is no evidence that migration and remittances can help household members 
to work more on non-farm activities (Table 8). It implies that remittances are not used for 
investment in household production or entrepreneurs activities.   
Table 8: Fixed-effects regression of having nonfarm work 
Explanatory variables Sample of children 
aged 6-14 
Sample of people 
aged 15-22 
Sample of people 
aged 23-60 
Sample of people 
aged from 60 
Having at least a migrant 
(yes=1, no=0) 
-0.0146  -0.0169  -0.0134  0.0217  
(0.0187)  (0.0232)  (0.0162)  (0.0225)  
Log of internal remittance  -0.0052*  -0.0145**  -0.0036  -0.0066 
 (0.0027)  (0.0057)  (0.0053)  (0.0081) 
Log of international 
remittance 
 -0.0128  -0.0171  -0.0021  -0.0277 
 (0.0097)  (0.0127)  (0.0108)  (0.0323) 
Not receiving internal 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
 -0.0292  -0.0937**  -0.0135  -0.0187 
 (0.0203)  (0.0431)  (0.0424)  (0.0678) 
Not receiving international 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
 -0.1036  -0.1889  -0.0187  -0.1820 
 (0.1041)  (0.1178)  (0.0996)  (0.3123) 
Household size 0.0040 0.0039 -0.0090 -0.0095 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0077 -0.0113 
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Explanatory variables Sample of children 
aged 6-14 
Sample of people 
aged 15-22 
Sample of people 
aged 23-60 
Sample of people 
aged from 60 
 
(0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0120) (0.0118) 
Proportion of children 
below 15 in household 
-0.0808** -0.0768** 0.0628 0.0633 0.0118 0.0117 0.0268 0.0367 
(0.0358) (0.0347) (0.0832) (0.0841) (0.0475) (0.0472) (0.1200) (0.1176) 
Proportion of elderly above 
60 in household 
-0.0784 -0.0732 0.0957 0.1020 -0.0113 -0.0138 0.0015 0.0017 
(0.0735) (0.0746) (0.1194) (0.1201) (0.0576) (0.0576) (0.1191) (0.1157) 
Proportion of female 
members in household 
0.0599 0.0623 0.1029 0.1004 0.0208 0.0196 0.1778* 0.1684* 
(0.0672) (0.0660) (0.0920) (0.0916) (0.0576) (0.0574) (0.0938) (0.0974) 
Sex of household head 
(male=1; female=0) 
-0.0331 -0.0346 0.0468** 0.0490** 0.0128 0.0114 0.0597 0.0638 
(0.0345) (0.0349) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0405) (0.0429) 
Age of household head -0.0086* -0.0086* -0.0050 -0.0061 -0.0181** -0.0183** 0.0102 0.0102 
 
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0094) (0.0093) 
Age of household head 
squared 
0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002** 0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Number of schooling years 
of household head 
0.0020 0.0021 -0.0050 -0.0048 -0.0049 -0.0046 -0.0017 -0.0019 
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0059) (0.0057) 
Dummy year 2012 0.0084* 0.0099** 0.0301*** 0.0323*** -0.0038 -0.0031 -0.034*** -0.0274** (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0122) (0.0109) 
Constant 0.2322** 0.3657** 0.1999 0.5043** 0.7866*** 0.8244*** -0.1812 0.0453 
 
(0.1176) (0.1660) (0.1566) (0.1961) (0.2431) (0.2638) (0.2748) (0.3968) 
Observations 4726 4726 4186 4186 15406 15406 2806 2806 
Number of individuals 2363 2363 2093 2093 7703 7703 1403 1403 
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
 
 Table 9 shows that migration tends to decrease the labor participation of household 
members. Young people aged 15 to 22 in migrant-sending households tend to attend 
school, and as a result they are less likely to work. However, for people aged 23 to 60, 
having a migrant in their families reduce the probability of having a wage job by 0.03.1 
Possibly, because of the absence of migrants the remaining adult members have to spend 
more time on housework and take care of other dependents, and they are less likely to 
participate into labor market.    
Table 9: Fixed-effects regression of having wage jobs 
Explanatory variables Sample of children 
aged 6-14 
Sample of people 
aged 15-22 
Sample of people 
aged 23-60 
Sample of people 
aged from 60 
Having at least a migrant 
(yes=1, no=0) 
0.0059  -0.0604*  -0.0297*  -0.0016  
(0.0130)  (0.0343)  (0.0160)  (0.0186)  
Log of internal remittance  -0.0037  -0.0149  -0.0010  -0.0074 
 (0.0052)  (0.0111)  (0.0047)  (0.0058) 
Log of international 
remittance 
 -0.0029  -0.0411**  -0.0188  -0.0050 
 (0.0092)  (0.0182)  (0.0138)  (0.0043) 
Not receiving internal 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
 -0.0292  -0.0858  -0.0116  -0.0500 
 (0.0376)  (0.0857)  (0.0373)  (0.0445) 
Not receiving international 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
 -0.0258  -0.3037*  -0.1692  -0.0349 
 (0.0953)  (0.1599)  (0.1281)  (0.0496) 
Household size -0.0027 -0.0036 0.0104 0.0122 0.0064 0.0078 -0.0017 -0.0028 
                                                 
1
 The proportion of people aged 23-60 having wage jobs is around 34% for households with migrants and 
42% for households without migrants. 
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Explanatory variables Sample of children 
aged 6-14 
Sample of people 
aged 15-22 
Sample of people 
aged 23-60 
Sample of people 
aged from 60 
 
(0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0135) (0.0130) (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0092) (0.0093) 
Proportion of children 
below 15 in household 
-0.193*** -0.191*** 0.0267 0.0136 -0.0298 -0.0397 -0.0333 -0.0288 
(0.0425) (0.0431) (0.1120) (0.1113) (0.0482) (0.0476) (0.0764) (0.0753) 
Proportion of elderly above 
60 in household 
0.0978 0.1038 0.2734 0.2544 -0.0809* -0.0865* 0.0295 0.0302 
(0.0864) (0.0868) (0.1838) (0.1837) (0.0480) (0.0483) (0.0565) (0.0567) 
Proportion of female 
members in household 
-0.0353 -0.0333 0.1384 0.1268 0.1361** 0.1274** -0.1088 -0.1095 
(0.0762) (0.0758) (0.1377) (0.1348) (0.0618) (0.0619) (0.0880) (0.0885) 
Sex of household head 
(male=1; female=0) 
-0.0159 -0.0178 0.0069 0.0023 -0.0216 -0.0226 -0.0069 -0.0031 
(0.0310) (0.0314) (0.0445) (0.0449) (0.0441) (0.0440) (0.0155) (0.0168) 
Age of household head -0.0058 -0.0062 -0.0203 -0.0212 0.0138* 0.0137* 0.0020 0.0017 
 
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0020) (0.0019) 
Age of household head 
squared 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Number of schooling years 
of household head 
0.0001 0.0000 -0.0082 -0.0073 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0035 -0.0036 
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Dummy year 2012 0.0104*** 0.0110*** 0.1140*** 0.1137*** -0.0097 -0.0105* -0.0071 -0.0054 (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0060) 
Constant 0.2756** 0.3424** 0.5966 1.0065* 0.0422 0.2248 0.1054 0.2015 
 
(0.1115) (0.1586) (0.5514) (0.5768) (0.2236) (0.2555) (0.0938) (0.1312) 
Observations 4726 4726 4186 4186 15406 15406 2806 2806 
Number of individuals 2363 2363 2093 2093 7703 7703 1403 1403 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
 
5.2. The impact of migration and remittances on individual outcomes 
 
In Tables 10 to 12, we examine the impact of migration on household-level outcomes. For 
each outcome variable, we present three modes. Model 1 does not include explanatory 
variables. Model 2 includes explanatory variables, but not household size. Model 3 
include explanatory variables as in Model 2 and plus household size. Migration means a 
decrease in the household size. Models 2 and 3 investigate whether the effect of migration 
and remittances on per capita income and consumption of home households is through the 
reduction in household size.  
Table 10 presents regression of log of per capita income on migration and 
remittances. All the three models produce similar estimates of the effect of migration and 
remittances. It shows that per capita income of migrant-sending households is not 
statistically significantly higher than per capita income of households not sending 
migrants. Possibly, migration leads to an increase in remittances but a reduction in income 
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earned by migrants if they had not migrated. As a result, the total effect of migration is not 
large.  
The receipt of remittances, especially international remittances, helps households 
increase their income significantly. According to Model 3, a one percent increase in 
internal remittances or international remittances results in a 0.055 percent or a 0.16 
percent increase in per capita income. The dependent variable is measured by per capita. 
Since the household size at mean is around 4, a one percent increase in internal 
remittances or international remittances results in a 0.22 percent or a 0.64 percent increase 
in per capita income, respectively. The elasticity is less than one. It implies that although 
migrant-sending households increase their income by remittances, they also experience a 
reduction in income due to the absence of migrants in their households.  
It should be noted that the coefficient of two dummy variables “Not receiving 
internal remittance” and “Not receiving international remittance” are positive. It means 
that without any remittance households receiving remittances have lower per capita 
income than households not receiving remittances.  
Table 10: Household fixed-effects regression of log of per capita income 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Having at least a migrant (yes=1, 
no=0) 
0.0322 0.0415 0.0048    
(0.0261) (0.0263) (0.0262)    
Log of internal remittance    0.0555*** 0.0584*** 0.0526*** 
   (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0083) 
Log of international remittance    0.1676*** 0.1690*** 0.1592*** 
   (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0238) 
Not receiving internal remittance 
(not=1, yes=0) 
   0.3950*** 0.4139*** 0.3775*** 
   (0.0667) (0.0648) (0.0648) 
Not receiving international 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
   1.3958*** 1.4070*** 1.3249*** 
   (0.2172) (0.2163) (0.2188) 
Household size   -0.0795***   -0.0686*** 
  (0.0100)   (0.0098) 
Proportion of children below 15 in 
household 
 -0.5022*** -0.2717***  -0.5107*** -0.3161*** 
 (0.0797) (0.0820)  (0.0766) (0.0795) 
Proportion of elderly above 60 in 
household 
 -0.0317 -0.1983***  -0.0483 -0.1949*** 
 (0.0728) (0.0754)  (0.0714) (0.0736) 
Proportion of female members in 
household 
 0.0317 0.0581  0.0218 0.0415 
 (0.0874) (0.0836)  (0.0842) (0.0814) 
Sex of household head (male=1; 
female=0) 
 -0.0736 -0.0346  -0.0685 -0.0332 
 (0.0668) (0.0671)  (0.0657) (0.0663) 
Age of household head  0.0223 0.0255*  0.0270* 0.0294* 
 (0.0146) (0.0155)  (0.0147) (0.0155) 
Age of household head squared  -0.0002* -0.0002*  -0.0003** -0.0003** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Number of schooling years of 
household head 
 -0.0008 -0.0004  -0.0007 -0.0003 
 (0.0058) (0.0059)  (0.0058) (0.0059) 
Dummy year 2012 0.4172*** 0.4140*** 0.4148*** 0.4079*** 0.4052*** 0.4058*** 
(0.0107) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0103) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
Constant 9.4796*** 9.1541*** 9.2743*** 7.6763*** 7.2269*** 7.4543*** 
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Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(0.0057) (0.4166) (0.4390) (0.2313) (0.4917) (0.5133) 
Observations 8314 8314 8314 8314 8314 8314 
Number of households 4157 4157 4157 4157 4157 4157 
R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012. 
Table 11 presents the effect of migration and remittances on log of per capita 
consumption expenditure. When household size is not controlled, the effect of migration 
on per capita expenditure is positive. However, the effect of migration is smaller and not 
significant when household size is controlled for. So the effect of migration on per capita 
expenditure is mainly through the household economies of scale. As the household size 
decreases, the per capita expenditure increases. This finding is consistent with the finding 
that there are no significant effects of migration on per capita income.  
The effect of remittances on expenditure is positive and significant in models 
either with or without household size. According to Model 3, a one percent increase in 
internal remittances or international remittances results in a 0.03 percent or a 0.05 percent 
increase in per capita income, respectively. The effect of remittances on expenditure is 
smaller than the effect on income. It means that remittances are also used for saving or 
buying household assets.   
Table 11: Household fixed-effects regression of log of per capita expenditure 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Having at least a migrant (yes=1, 
no=0) 
0.0573*** 0.0639*** 0.0138    
(0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0187)    
Log of internal remittance    0.0365*** 0.0384*** 0.0296*** 
   (0.0074) (0.0069) (0.0065) 
Log of international remittance    0.0624*** 0.0613*** 0.0462*** 
   (0.0184) (0.0174) (0.0165) 
Not receiving internal remittance 
(not=1, yes=0) 
   0.2648*** 0.2799*** 0.2243*** 
   (0.0587) (0.0559) (0.0534) 
Not receiving international 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
   0.5228*** 0.5079*** 0.3824*** 
   (0.1609) (0.1526) (0.1455) 
Household size   -0.1086***   -0.1049*** 
  (0.0087)   (0.0084) 
Proportion of children below 15 in 
household 
 -0.6188*** -0.3039***  -0.6164*** -0.3189*** 
 (0.0661) (0.0650)  (0.0657) (0.0647) 
Proportion of elderly above 60 in 
household 
 0.1228* -0.1049  0.1201* -0.1040 
 (0.0734) (0.0733)  (0.0721) (0.0725) 
Proportion of female members in 
household 
 -0.0595 -0.0235  -0.0602 -0.0301 
 (0.0763) (0.0701)  (0.0745) (0.0689) 
Sex of household head (male=1; 
female=0) 
 -0.1643*** -0.1110*  -0.1676*** -0.1136* 
 (0.0599) (0.0601)  (0.0589) (0.0598) 
Age of household head  0.0098 0.0141  0.0122 0.0159 
 (0.0107) (0.0109)  (0.0105) (0.0107) 
Age of household head squared  -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Number of schooling years of  0.0067 0.0073  0.0069 0.0076 
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Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
household head 
 (0.0053) (0.0054)  (0.0054) (0.0055) 
Dummy year 2012 0.3747*** 0.3681*** 0.3693*** 0.3710*** 0.3648*** 0.3658*** 
(0.0095) (0.0102) (0.0099) (0.0095) (0.0102) (0.0100) 
Constant 9.5171*** 9.5642*** 9.7284*** 8.7289*** 8.7272*** 9.0749*** 
(0.0050) (0.2833) (0.2828) (0.1758) (0.3287) (0.3289) 
Observations 8314 8314 8314 8314 8314 8314 
Number of households 4157 4157 4157 4157 4157 4157 
R-squared 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.45 0.47 0.51 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012. 
 
Finally, we examine the effect of migration and remittances on expenditure 
poverty in Table 12. The effect of migration on expenditure poverty is negative and small, 
and it’s only significant in Model 2. Regarding the effect of remittances, only internal 
remittances have significant and negative effects on poverty. This is because internal 
remittances cover a larger proportion of households than international remittances. 
However, the magnitude of the effect of internal remittance on poverty is very small. 
According to Model 3, if the internal remittances increase by 1 percent, the probability of 
being poor decreased by only 0.00012.  
Table 12: Household fixed-effects regression of poverty status 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Having at least a migrant (yes=1, 
no=0) 
-0.0268 -0.0298* -0.0136    
(0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0167)    
Log of internal remittance    -0.0136** -0.0151** -0.0122** 
   (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0060) 
Log of international remittance    -0.0139 -0.0151 -0.0101 
   (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0097) 
Not receiving internal remittance 
(not=1, yes=0) 
   -0.1088** -0.1193** -0.1010** 
   (0.0500) (0.0496) (0.0492) 
Not receiving international 
remittance (not=1, yes=0) 
   -0.1135 -0.1239 -0.0826 
   (0.0907) (0.0909) (0.0934) 
Household size   0.0350***   0.0345*** 
  (0.0066)   (0.0067) 
Proportion of children below 15 in 
household 
 0.1810*** 0.0796  0.1782*** 0.0804 
 (0.0569) (0.0599)  (0.0569) (0.0600) 
Proportion of elderly above 60 in 
household 
 -0.0077 0.0657  -0.0095 0.0642 
 (0.0465) (0.0482)  (0.0466) (0.0483) 
Proportion of female members in 
household 
 -0.0280 -0.0396  -0.0286 -0.0385 
 (0.0531) (0.0528)  (0.0528) (0.0525) 
Sex of household head (male=1; 
female=0) 
 0.0326 0.0155  0.0357 0.0179 
 (0.0407) (0.0404)  (0.0401) (0.0401) 
Age of household head  -0.0207*** -0.0221***  -0.0214*** -0.0227*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0079)  (0.0078) (0.0079) 
Age of household head squared  0.0002*** 0.0002***  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Number of schooling years of 
household head 
 -0.0044 -0.0046  -0.0047 -0.0049 
 (0.0038) (0.0038)  (0.0038) (0.0038) 
Dummy year 2012 -0.0457*** -0.0423*** -0.0427*** -0.0453*** -0.0418*** -0.0422*** 
(0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0067) 
Constant 0.1916*** 0.6634*** 0.6105*** 0.4105*** 0.9187*** 0.8044*** 
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(0.0037) (0.2113) (0.2135) (0.1017) (0.2427) (0.2489) 
Observations 8314 8314 8314 8314 8314 8314 
Number of households 4157 4157 4157 4157 4157 4157 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the pattern and the impact of migration and remittances on household 
welfare in Vietnam using fixed-effects regressions and panel data from Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Surveys 2010 and 2012. Rural households are more likely to 
send members for migration than urban households. However, the proportion of 
households receiving internal remittances is quite similar between urban and rural areas. 
The proportion of receiving international remittances is higher among urban households 
than rural ones.  
  Overall, the effect of migration as well as remittances on employment of 
remaining members on home households is small. People at the working age in 
households with migration and remittances are less likely to work than people in other 
households. They are also less likely to participate in labor market. Possibly, because of 
the absence of migrants the remaining members have to spend more time on housework 
and take care of other dependents. There is no evidence that migration and remittances can 
help household members to work more on non-farm activities. It implies that remittances 
are not used for household business or entrepreneurs activities.       
  Since migration does not help household members increase household business as 
well as non-farm employment, it can only benefit households through remittances. The 
results show that remittances, especially international remittances help receiving 
households increase per capita income and per capita expenditure. The effect of 
remittances on expenditure is smaller than the effect on income. It implies that receiving 
households use remittances on not only consumption but also saving and buying 
household assets.   
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 Since remittances have a positive effect on per capita expenditure, they are 
expected to reduce expenditure poverty. Internal remittances cover a larger proportion of 
households than international remittances, and as a result only internal remittances have a 
small effect on poverty reduction. The effect on poverty is small, since remittances tend to 
non-poor households than poor ones.  
The total effect of migration on per capita income of migrant-sending households 
is small and not statistically significantly. Although migration leads to an increase in 
remittances, it also leads to a reduction in income earned by migrants if they had not 
migrated. In addition, not all migrant-sending households are able to receive remittances 
(around two third of them receive remittances). As a result, the total effect of migration on 
household income is small. There are no significant effects of migration on total 
consumption expenditure of migrant-sending households. However, per capita 
consumption expenditure of migrant-sending households increases because of a reduction 
in household size.  
 In summary, remittances are important for migrant-sending households, especially 
households in ethnic minorities and poor regions. The positive effect of migration on 
welfare of migrant-sending households is mainly through remittances. Without 
remittances, there are significant effects of migration on migrant-sending households. 
Reduction of migration cost and provision of employment for migrants in destination 
areas are important to improve welfare of people in rural and poor areas.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Outcome variables of households with and without migrants 
Variables 
2010 2012 
With 
migrants 
Without 
migrants 
With 
migrants 
Without 
migrants 
Household outcomes 
Per capita income 15998 17326 23701 25164 
Per capita expenditure 15189 16949 22664 23451 
Expenditure poor (poor=1; non-poor=0) 13.0 21.4 11.4 18.2 
Individual outcomes 
    
Children aged 6-14 
    
Attending school (yes=1, no=0) 92.6 93.9 93.4 93.9 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 9.7 10.0 9.5 7.9 
Number of working hours per month 9.1 8.5 7.2 6.5 
Having nonfarm work in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 1.2 1.1 1.8 0.7 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 2.1 1.2 1.3 0.8 
People aged 15-22 
    
Attending school (yes=1, no=0) 50.7 47.6 51.4 50.8 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 47.0 50.3 48.1 49.1 
Number of working hours per month 74.0 84.3 82.1 82.9 
Having nonfarm work in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 7.0 9.0 9.4 7.6 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 21.4 22.8 26.1 24.1 
People aged 23-60 
    
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 90.2 92.1 91.9 92.4 
Number of working hours per month 164.8 175.8 161.6 173.9 
Having nonfarm work in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 26.5 30.2 24.9 28.6 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 34.4 42.2 34.2 42.8 
People aged 61+ 
    
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 51.2 43.4 59.0 41.3 
Number of working hours per month 55.5 48.4 64.6 45.8 
Having nonfarm work in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 9.2 10.5 10.0 8.7 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 4.0 4.7 7.3 4.7 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
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Table A.2. Outcome variables of households with and without internal remittances  
Variables 
2010 2012 
With 
internal 
remittance 
Without 
internal 
remittance 
With 
internal 
remittance 
Without 
internal 
remittance 
Household outcomes 
Per capita income 17059 17970 25178 23895 
Per capita expenditure 16576 17907 23516 22453 
Expenditure poor (poor=1; non-poor=0) 20.3 22.2 16.8 20.2 
Individual outcomes 
Children aged 6-14 
Attending school (yes=1, no=0) 93.7 94.8 94.0 93.2 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 10.3 8.2 7.6 9.9 
Number of working hours per month 8.7 7.6 6.1 8.4 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 1.4 0.5 0.9 0.5 
People aged 15-22 
Attending school (yes=1, no=0) 48.3 46.2 51.1 49.6 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 50.0 50.1 48.5 51.0 
Number of working hours per month 82.6 87.3 82.4 84.4 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 23.4 19.6 24.8 22.0 
People aged 23-60 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 91.9 92.2 92.2 92.7 
Number of working hours per month 174.5 176.5 173.0 170.1 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 42.2 38.0 42.8 37.3 
People aged 61+ 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 44.0 45.2 44.8 43.0 
Number of working hours per month 48.2 55.2 48.7 54.4 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 4.8 4.0 5.4 3.6 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
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Table A.3. Outcome variables of households with and without international remittances  
Variables 
2010 2012 
With 
international 
remittance 
Without 
international 
remittance 
With 
international 
remittance 
Without 
international 
remittance 
Household outcomes 
Per capita income 27928 16737 37044 24449 
Per capita expenditure 26946 16345 33783 22893 
Expenditure poor (poor=1; non-poor=0) 5.1 21.3 5.8 17.8 
Individual outcomes 
Children aged 6-14 
Attending school (yes=1, no=0) 98.0 93.7 95.8 93.8 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 4.4 10.2 6.0 8.1 
Number of working hours per month 2.7 8.8 2.9 6.7 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.9 
People aged 15-22 
Attending school (yes=1, no=0) 60.8 47.3 64.9 50.3 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 36.6 50.7 30.4 49.6 
Number of working hours per month 61.4 84.5 51.7 83.9 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 17.2 23.0 19.4 24.5 
People aged 23-60 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 83.1 92.3 83.3 92.7 
Number of working hours per month 157.9 175.6 152.0 173.5 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 32.9 41.9 36.4 42.1 
People aged 61+ 
Working in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 37.8 44.5 34.6 45.2 
Number of working hours per month 46.0 49.2 36.0 50.0 
Having wage job in the last month (yes=1, no=0) 4.3 4.7 4.4 5.2 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
 
 
Table A.4: Household-level explanatory variables 
Household-level variable 2010 2012 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Household size 3.964 1.566 3.935 1.576 
Proportion of children below 15 in household 0.205 0.207 0.196 0.205 
Proportion of elderly above 60 in household 0.131 0.263 0.146 0.278 
Proportion of female members in household 0.520 0.203 0.522 0.201 
Sex of household head (male=1; female=0) 0.753 0.432 0.743 0.437 
Age of household head 49.47 14.05 51.00 13.96 
Number of schooling years of household head 7.288 3.711 7.368 3.667 
Number of observations 4157 4157 
Source: authors’ estimates from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
